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Topic · 45 articles

Kernel & Security

Every week there's a CVE with a logo and a release with a changelog nobody reads. Most of it doesn't matter to you. Some of it really does, and the difference is rarely the CVSS score.

These are the MOTD takes on kernel releases, OS security advisories, and the hardening work that actually changes your threat model, plus the Tips that explain the mechanisms underneath. If you want the sandboxing primitives themselves, that's its own hub.

Start here

Read these first, in this order.

  1. 01

    Tip · 2026-09-23

    io_uring's attack surface and IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS

    io_uring has been a CVE factory since it shipped in Linux 5.1. IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS locks down what a ring instance can do, but it only works if you apply it before handing the fd to untrusted code. Here is the actual API.

  2. 02

    MOTD · 2026-09-22

    io_uring shipped in 2019 to eliminate syscall overhead. It also became the most reliably exploited surface in the kernel. Production fleets are disabling it.

    Google disabled io_uring across Android, Chrome, and their production Linux fleet. Ubuntu ships with unprivileged io_uring restricted by default. The Docker and Kubernetes default seccomp profiles block io_uring_setup. The performance case is still real. The security case for restriction is also real.

  3. 03

    MOTD · 2026-09-24

    The eBPF verifier is 30,000 lines of C, and it has the privilege-escalation CVEs to show for it

    eBPF runs in the Linux kernel. The verifier that is supposed to make user-submitted programs safe is one of the largest, most complex files in the kernel tree, and every production distribution has disabled unprivileged BPF access. Here is the state of the restriction and why it exists.

  4. 04

    MOTD · 2026-07-27

    Everything is a critical CVE now, which means nothing is

    CVSS score inflation has gotten bad enough that a 9.8 barely raises RodHat's eyebrow anymore. That's the actual crisis.

  5. 05

    MOTD · 2026-08-31

    The xz backdoor was 28 months ago. Here is what the supply chain security scoreboard actually reads.

    March 2024 was supposed to be the wake-up call that fixed open source supply chain security. It is August 2026. Here is the honest accounting of what improved, what did not, and why the underlying economics that made the attack possible have not fundamentally changed.

The syscalls underneath

Version introduced, sourced from the man page. Full cards in the syscall reference, or check your kernel.

InterfaceSinceWhat it does
io_uring_setup(2)Linux 5.1Create an io_uring instance: shared submission/completion rings for async I/O.
getrandom(2)Linux 3.17Fill a buffer with random bytes from the kernel CSPRNG, without opening /dev/urandom.
seccomp(2)Linux 3.17Set the thread's seccomp state: strict mode or a BPF filter on every syscall.
landlock_create_ruleset(2)Linux 5.13Create a Landlock ruleset fd, step one of unprivileged filesystem/network sandboxing.

More console tips (2)

MOTD (38)

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