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Cisco IOS XE CVE-2023-20198 is still being scanned for, three years on

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Editorial card for a Cisco IOS XE web UI vulnerability scan
Editorial card: RodHat

On November 5, Johannes Ullrich at the SANS Internet Storm Center wrote up a honeypot hit: a POST /%77ebui_wsma_https carrying a uname -a payload. He suspects it targets CVE-2023-20198, the Cisco IOS XE web UI bug disclosed October 16, 2023. He says outright that it’s nothing new. I’m writing it up anyway, because a three-year-old bug getting scanned means somebody’s still getting paid for it.

The bug: per Cisco’s advisory, the attacker uses CVE-2023-20198 for initial access and issues a privilege 15 command to create a local user. That user then exploits a second web UI flaw, CVE-2023-20273, to get root and write an implant to the file system. NVD lists the first at CVSS 10.0 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) and Cisco rates the second at 7.2. Both are tracked as CSCwh87343. Cisco says there are no workarounds, only fixed releases.

The part I like in a grim way is the scanner. Ullrich says it identifies itself with Opt-Out-Email and Opt-Out-Url headers, pointing at rootevidence.com, which he describes as another exposure management platform. He found no standard for those headers and thinks it’s the first time he’s seen them, though the vendor has apparently used them since last December. So a company is sending an unauthenticated command-execution probe at your router and politely offering an unsubscribe link. I’ve received less courteous mail from actual humans. Also note the %77 in place of the w. Ullrich bets some WAFs fall for it. I’d take that bet.

Check yourself, per Cisco:

  1. Run show running-config | include ip http server|secure|active. If ip http server or ip http secure-server shows up, the web UI is on.
  2. If those lines are present, ip http active-session-modules none (HTTP) or ip http secure-active-session-modules none (HTTPS) makes the bugs unexploitable over that transport.
  3. Disable the feature with no ip http server and no ip http secure-server. Both, if both are configured.
  4. If you must keep it, restrict it with ip http access-class to a trusted network. Never leave it on the internet.
  5. Look in the logs for %SYS-5-CONFIG_P entries naming users you don’t recognize, and for %WEBUI-6-INSTALL_OPERATION_INFO with a filename nobody installed. Cisco names cisco_tac_admin and cisco_support as accounts to look for.

IOS XE before release 16 is not affected, nor are ASA, FTD or ISE, per the advisory. Anything else with the web UI enabled and unpatched is on the list.

Cisco says the web UI comes with the default image, no license needed. I’ve never understood why a router needs a GUI that ends up running attacker commands as root. The CLI over SSH did the job in 1996, and a config file doesn’t need a wizard. For the broader habit of treating a 10.0 as a news event rather than a hygiene failure, see the CVE scoring inflation piece and the kernel and security hub. Go run that grep.

Sources

  1. CVE-2023-20198 (NIST National Vulnerability Database)
  2. Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS XE Software Web UI Feature (cisco-sa-iosxe-webui-privesc-j22SaA4z) (Cisco)
  3. Vulnerability Scans for Older Cisco IOS Vulnerability / Opt-Out Headers (SANS Internet Storm Center)